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HEN Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in March, 1933,
there was an insistent demand for action to end or at least to
alleviate the depression. It was a demand for action opposed
to American customs and traditions, for action which would work funda-
mental alterations in basic American institutions. Faith in "natural eco-
nomic forces" had waned. Governmental action interfering in economic
affairs was sought. Action by the federal government, for local and state
governments were obviously impotent. Prompt action. Roosevelt called
for, and Congress enacted, the statutes known as the recovery legislation.'
These statutes did effect a fundamental re-distribution of legislative,
governmental, and economic power. Congress delegated vast legislative
power to the President, to his appointees, and (in effect) to associations of
• This article will appear in Studies in Honor of Orrin Kip McMurray.
** Professor of Law, Duke University.
'Chief among the statutes known as the recovery legislation, all enacted in 1933, are:
National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. i95, i U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 701-712.
Public Works Act (N.I.R.A., Title II), 48 Stat. 200, 4o U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 4o-414.
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 6oi-6ig.
Emergency Relief Act, 48 Stat. 55, i5 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 721-728.
Unemployment Relief Act, 48 Stat. 22, i6 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 585-590.
Employment Service Act, 48 Stat. Ir3, 29 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 49-49L.
Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. 128, 12 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 146x-x468.
Farm Credit Act, 48 Stat. 257, 12 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ ii3i- 3 8f.
Emergency Banking Acts, 48 Stat. 1, 3, 5, 20, 72, 12 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 95a, b, 204-211,
347d.
Banking Act, 48 Stat. 62, i2 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 22ia-22ib.
Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74, I5 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 77a-77mm.
Act Amendatory to Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act (47 Stat. 5, i5 U.S.C.A.
Supp. § 6oi ff.) 48 Stat. 141, 15 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 6o5.
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 48 Stat. 211, 49 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 250-267.
Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 58, i6 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 831-83Icc.
Credit and Currency Expansion Act, 48 Stat. 51, 31 U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 821-823.
Gold Clause Annulment Resolution, 48 Stat. 113, 3 x U.S.C.A. Supp. §§ 462-463.
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business men. The federal government invaded fields hitherto controlled
exclusively by the states. Many of the powers of the managers of business
enterprises were transferred to associations of those managers and to pub-
lic officials. Whether the recovery legislation has been or will be efficacious
in ending or even in alleviating the depression are questions with which this
paper is not concerned. It is concerned with assertions which have been
made as to its constitutionality.
That the Supreme Court of the United States will uphold all of the re-
covery legislation and most of the official action thereunder is the con-
clusion reached by those commentators whose writings reveal what I con-
sider to be the view generally accepted by informed persons as to the
relative importance, in the decision of constitutional cases, of the written
Constitution, the doctrines of constitutional law, and the statesmanship
of the judges. The relative importance of those three factors is, it seems
to me, misconceived by other commentators who conclude that much
of the recovery legislation is clearly unconstitutional or that the Supreme
Court can uphold important parts of it only by distinguishing or over-
ruling and repudiating past decisions and doctrines in such a way as to
subject its members to accusations of intellectual dishonesty and to ridi-
cule and contempt. That which this group misconceives is not explicitly
dealt with by the other group. There seems, then, to be a need for an
explicit discussion of the relative importance of judge, doctrine, and docu-
ment in constitutional law cases. This paper is an attempt to meet that
need and to indicate what will be the relative importance of those factors
in the decision of the constitutional questions raised by the recovery legis-
lation.
T=E CONSTITUTION-DOCTRiNE-THE JUDGES
I
Undoubtedly most of the recovery legislation is "unconstitutional," if
that word be given the meaning it has in England. There is, in England,
no written constitution; there are no legal limitations upon the power of
Parliament; no statute enacted by Parliament is ever treated as void by
the courts on the ground that it is inconsistent with the British Constitu-
tion. Yet there is a British "Constitution" and it is not unusual for a
member of Parliament to urge in opposition to a proposed statute that it
is "unconstitutional." He means that, in his opinion, the proposed statute
is opposed to British customs and traditions, that its enactment would
effect a fundamental alteration in basic British institutions, that it would
change something which he and, he thinks, most other Englishmen had
regarded as permanent. Such a proposed statute is "unconstitutional," in
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the English sense. But if and when it is enacted, the statute is no longer
unconstitutional. Its enactment has altered the British "Constitution."
According to American usage, to say that a statute is unconstitutional
is to predict that the judges will treat it as void. There is an American
"Constitution" in the English sense-the aggregate of American institu-
tions, customs, traditions; it is the primary interest of the student of po-
litical economy and of the lawyer qua student of political economy. But
our judges do not treat as void statutes which are inconsistent with that
"Constitution." The Constitution upon the basis of which they do treat
statutes as void consists of a written document and the doctrines of con-
stitutional law. Large segments of American institutions, customs, and
traditions are not rendered immune from legislative change by that docu-
ment and those doctrines. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, in large part due to
an unconscious confusing of the two senses of the word "unconstitution-
al," that many conservatives, distrustful of anything new, are now at-
taching that epithet to much of the recovery legislation.2
II
The constitutional validity of some statutes can be predicted with as-
surance from the words of the written Constitution-the document-
alone. It contains some clauses so worded that practically no construc-
tion or interpretation is needed. Any intelligent reader with some knowl-
edge of history prior to 1789, when the Constitution was adopted, can pre-
dict accurately what applications the Supreme Court will make of those
clauses.'
Most of the clauses in the document, however, are not so worded. Con-
gress, for example, is empowered "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States."' What laws are "regulations"?
2 There is nothing novel in their conduct. A generation ago, conservatives reacted similarly
to workmen's compensation acts and other unprecedented legislation. Speaking for a majority
of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice McKenna protested against this attitude in German Alli-
ance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 409, 58 L.Ed. 1o1, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914):
"Against that conservatism of the mind, which puts to question every new act of regulating
legislation and regards the legislation invalid or dangerous until it has become familiar, govern-
ment-state and National-has pressed on in the general welfare; and our reports are full of
cases where in instance after instance the exercise of regulation was resisted and yet sustained
against attacks asserted to be justified by the Constitution of the United States. The dread of
the moment having passed, no one is now heard to say that rights were restrained or their con-
stitutional guaranties impaired."
IThis is probably true, e.g., of Article I, Section 9, Clause 4, which provides, inter alia, that
"No Capitation .... Tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken," and of Article I, Section 9, Clause 5, which provides that
"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."
4 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
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What activities are "Commerce"? What commerce is "Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States"? Here the inquirer may
not rest content with the document. He must turn to the Supreme Court
reports. They will reveal what doctrines the Court has derived by con-
struction and interpretation from the commerce clause.
The Constitution, then, comprises the document and also the doctrines
which the Supreme Court justices derive from it by construction or in-
terpretation. These two parts of the Constitution are partially inde-
pendent, since construction and interpretation are not processes which
yield the same results to all persons. The doctrines derive, not from the
document alone, but also from the judges' social, economic, and political
philosophies. Within limits set by the extensibility and contractibility
of the words used in the light of the known relevant historical data, the
construer or interpreter of a clause in the Constitution (or a statute, or
will, or other document) is free to pronounce and should pronounce a con-
struction or interpretation which will lead to results he believes to be de-
sirable. Within the specified limits, the judge creates constitutional law
not found in the document. And he does this with intellectual honesty
and without usurping the authority coticeded to the written Constitution.
The limits vary for each clause; they are usually, because most of the
clauses are phrased in general terms, extremely wide. Within those limits,
the judge is called upon to be a statesman creating wise constitutional
law, making wise decisions s
The judge may exceed these limits. He may err in determining them.
More important, he may intentionally usurp the authority generally con-
ceded to the document. Regard for the public welfare under the condi-
tions of today-conditions vastly different from those of 1789-may
prompt him to do so. He may believe that had the framers of the docu-
ment foreseen the conditions of today, they would have laid down rules
other than those they did lay down. Realizing the extreme difficulty of
securing an amendment to the document by the method it prescribes,
these considerations may well prove irresistible temptations to surrepti-
tious judicial amendment. 6
s Cf. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930).
6The present justices of the Supreme Court of the United States disagree as to what con-
stitutes construction and interpretation, what judicial amendment, of the words of the written
Constitution. Cf. the majority and minority opinions in Home Building and Loan Association
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934). For the majority, Hughes, C. J., said: "If by
the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it is
intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpreta-
tion which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
them, the statement carries its own refutation." 290 U.S. 442-443.
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Nor is this all. I have distinguished two parts of the Constitution-
the document and the doctrines which the Supreme Court justices derive
from it by construction or interpretation. In the creation of the second
part, the words of the written Constitution-the document-have played
and do play an important r6le. There is a third part of the Constitution the
content of which derives not at all from the docunent. The judges have held
since the latter part of the nineteenth century that certain clauses of the
document authorize them to pronounce doctrines not deducible by con-
struction or interpretation from the document. 7 The due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, they hold, authorize them to
declare invalid as unconstitutional any statute, not specifically authorized
by other clauses of the document, which they deem arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable. Under them, the judges pronounce doctrines as to the
reasonableness of statutes relating to procedure, to jurisdiction to tax, to
the regulation of public utility rates, to any and every subject-doctrines
constituting in no sense of the word construction or interpretation of lan-
guage found in the written document.' In pronouncing these doctrines,
which constitute the third and last part of the Constitution, the judges
act wholly as statesmen. 9
To summarize to this point, the Constitution upon the basis of which
the Supreme Court will treat a statute as void consists of the written
document and of the doctrines of constitutional law which the judges will
apply. These doctrines are of two kinds: doctrines which the judges of
the past have derived or the judges of today will derive by coQnstruction or
interpretation from the document; and doctrines, whose content derives
not at all from the document, announced under the authority held by the
judges to be conferred upon them by the due process clauses. In creating
these doctrines, the judges are called upon to be statesmen; with respect
to doctrines of the first kind, their statesmanship is limited by the words
of each clause and the known relevant historical data, but with respect to
7 A brief review of relevant constitutional history is attempted, infra, 674 ff.
8 It is the possession by American judges of this power to invalidate statutes upon the basis
of wholly non-documental constitutional law which differentiates the American institution of
judicial review from that of Australia or of Canada.
9 The limits upon judicial statesmanship held by the judges to be created by the words of the
impairment clause in Article I, Section io, Clause i, the equal protection clause in Amendment
XIV, and the privileges and immunities clause in Article IV, Section 2, Clause i are so slight
that the power of the judges in the construction, interpretation, and application of these clauses
approaches very nearly their power under the due process clauses. As to the privileges and im-
munities clause of Article IV, see note, 18 Cal. L. Rev. 159 (193o); as to the impairment clause,
see the opinion of Hughes, C. J., in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934).
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doctrines of the second kind their statesmanship is wholly unlimited.
Moreover, doctrines purporting to be derived by construction or interpre-
tation from the document may be, on the contrary, the result of usurpa-
tion by the judges, perhaps impelled by motives of statesmanship, of the
authority conceded by all to the document. As against the words of the
document, the part played by the statesmanship of the judges bulks large.
III
There are other considerations which make the r6le of the judges as
statesmen even more important.
In the first place, the existence of doctrines announced and decisions
rendered by their predecessors, even when the judges of today adhere to
them, does not narrow as much as is sometimes assumed their freedom
to reach results they believe to be desirable. There is considerable room
for statesmanship in the development and application of accepted doc-
trines and decisions; ° th6 doctrines and decisions do not destroy, but
merely limit, the freedom of the judge to decide as he thinks he ought."r
Moreover, examination of the Supreme Court reports reveals that as to
many matters the Court has laid down conflicting doctrines and rendered
conflicting decisions without admitting the existence of the conflict. As
to many subjects both doctrine and decision are confused. This confusion,
this multiplicity and heterogeneity of precedent, permits the judges of to-
day to select that one of existing doctrines, those past decisions, which
will indicate in the case before them the decision which they think wise.
Secondly, many of today's doctrines of constitutional law embody tests
of such a nature that the doctrine does little, if anything, more than direct
the judges to decide the case before them as they think best. As will ap-
pear later, this is true in the case of most of the doctrines pronounced
under the due process clauses, which do little more than ring the changes
on the word "unreasonable"; it is true of the doctrine which has to do
with the delegation of power by Congress to the President and others;
it is frequently true of doctrines allocating power between the federal
government and the states. Where doctrines embody such tests not only
do they restrict judicial statesmanship hardly at all, decisions applying
them are authoritative only for the narrow points decided and later cases
can be easily distinguished from them.
Finally, the r6le of the judges as statesmen is tremendously increased
by the fact that the Supreme Court's tradition permits and modern
lo See Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. 833 (1931). Cf., for an extreme "realist" view, Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (i93o).
11 Here, too, the judge, consciously or unconsciously, may usurp the authority which he pro-
fesses to concede to doctrine and past decisions.
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practice makes not unusual the repudiation of doctrine and the overruling
of past decisions.1 2 Changes in the judges' approach which have occurred
in the past twenty years or so make this of especial significance today.
The opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis and the
writings of commentators such as Thomas Reed Powell have brought it
about that the judges of today are more fully conscious than were their
predecessors that what doctrines shall be created, what decisions rendered,
has depended and does depend more upon the wisdom of the judges than
upon the wording of the document. This realization, coupled with the
contagious effect of Mr. Justice Holmes's scepticism as to the power of
any human being to achieve ultimate wisdom,3 has made some of the
judges less willing than were their predecessors to veto changes in our
institutions deemed by Congress to be necessary. Coupled with Mr.
Justice Brandeis's insistence that the judges' decisions will be wise ones
only if they inform themselves fully as to the facts, as to the needs the
questioned legislation was enacted to meet, 4 the judges' realization that
their task is that of statesmen has made some of them more willing than
were their predecessors to re-examine their initial uninformed disapproval
of questioned legislation. Realizing that they are statesmen attempting to
reach wise decisions, some of the judges are today influenced less by tradi-
tionally accepted ideas as to the respective spheres of government and
business, of state and federal governments, of Congress and the Presi-
dent, more by the growth and general acceptance of new ideas as to the
proper allocation of those spheres. For all these reasons, the judges'
deference to the decisions and doctrines of their predecessors has been
lessened. For if those decisions and doctrines were not deductions from
the written Constitution, but merely the wisdom of the judges of yester-
day, they should not be binding upon the legislatures or judges of today-
surely not if they were pronounced by judges who had not fully informed
themselves as to the facts, or if since their pronouncement the factual
situation has changed, or if they were the result of views of policy which
have become outmoded. And to the extent that the deference of the
judges to precedent has been lessened, the freedom of the judges of today
to act as statesmen is increased.
12 The dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 405, 768 L.Ed. 815, 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (1932), states the Court's tradition and practice and
lists the cases which have been overruled.
13 This scepticism is perhaps most explicitly stated in Mr. Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 63 o , 63 L.Ed. 1173, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919).
14 Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517,
68 L.Ed. 813, 44 Sup. Ct. 412 (1924) well illustrates his method. Cf. Mr. Justice Stone's dis-
senting opinion in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359, 72 L.Ed. 913, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928).
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IV
All that I have written sums up to this: the freedom of the judges
of today to decide cases as they think best (resulting from the part their
own wisdom plays in construing and interpreting clauses in the written
Constitution, in pronouncing doctrines under the due process clauses, in
the development and application of doctrines and past decisions, in
determining whether or not to repudiate old doctrines and overrule pasi
decisions) is so great that their statesmanship plays a far greater part in
the determination of what statutes are constitutional than do either the
words of the document or the pronouncements of their predecessors.
The judges, like other statesmen, have been influenced by prevailing
sentiment with respect to "the historical rights of Englishmen," "Anglo-
Saxon" traditions of individual liberty, American traditions, customs,
and institutions.'- But, again like other statesmen, they have felt the
needs of a society which has become more and more unlike the America
of pre-Revolutionary or pre-Civil War days."6 Their statesmanship has
reflected that sentiment and those needs, as it has reflected the rest of
their social, economic, and political philosophies. Consequently, although
the Supreme Court justices could veto practically any statute, the area
within which they are likely to veto statutes which may be enacted by
legislators who are products of the same general environment as the
judges, is fairly narrow. Moreover the area is further restricted by a con-
sideration not yet mentioned-the fact that past decisions upholding
Congressional legislation are less likely to be overruled than are past
decisions invalidating it.
As a single economic and social unit has been fashioned out of a
congeries of quasi-independent states, the federal government has ex-
is This is illustrated by holdings that the due process clause of Amendment XIV is violated
by state action infringing certain of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments
against federal infringement only. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 77 L.Ed. 158,
53 Sup. Ct. 55 (1932). But see Hurtado v. California, 11o U.S. 516, 28 L.Ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct.
i1, 292 (1884) and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 53 L.Ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (19o8).
A Cf. the following statement by Hughes, C. I., in Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934): "It is manifest from this review of our de-
cisions that there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare. The settlement
and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing den-
sity of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of our
economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of society in
order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought
that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of the State it-
self were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of the
State are directly affected. . . "
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tended its control further and further over matters once within the ex-
clusive control of the states. With few and minor exceptions the Supreme
Court has been able to hold these extensions of federal control valid. It
has permitted extension after extension, each going further than the pre-
ceding ones. And once the Court has upheld an extension of federal control
it has never retraced its steps and overruled that holding. Similarly, as a
simple agricultural society has become a complex, interdependent, indus-
trial one, government (federal and state) has gradually limited the liberty
and the property rights of individuals and corporations. There have been
notable exceptions, but more than ninety-nine per cent of this regulation
has been upheld. Decisions invalidating particular regulations have been
overruled from time to time, but once the Court has upheld an extension of
governmental regulation of personal and property rights it has never over-
ruled that holding. In short, decisions limiting governmental power, de-
cisions denying Federal power, are likely to be overruled; decisions up-
holding governmental power, in general, or federal power, are not. More-
over, no delegation of power by Congress has ever been invalidated;
successive delegations, each greater than the preceding, have been up-
held.Y7
What statutes the Supreme Court justices are likely to veto depends
primarily, then, on what statutes have been upheld in the past. Secondary
in importance, because likely to be overruled, are the past decisions in-
validating statutes and the doctrines announced in those decisions. In
some few cases, the words of the document play an important part.
Prevalent attitudes, in which the judges share, toward existing institu-
tions bulk large. Within the limits which these considerations tend to fix,
what statutes are constitutional depends upon what nine men happen to
be justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon what their
social, economic, and political philosophies are, upon the extent to which
they believe judges should go in vetoing legislation.,8
The judges' growing realization of the nature of their role and of the
necessity of their being informed if their decisions are to be wise, their
growing scepticism as to the finality of their own wisdom and even more
as to the finality of the wisdom of their predecessors, their tendency
more and more to adopt a policy of laissez-faire toward legislatures and
especially toward Congress-these are the most significant developments
in constitutional law today.
'7 These generalizations will be supported, in part at least, in subsequent portions of this
paper.
18 That the minimum wage decision, Adldns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 67 L.Ed.
785, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923), is a striking example of this fact is conclusively shown in Powell,
The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 545 (1924).
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Three types of attack are made upon the constitutionality of the re-
covery legislation. It is contended that it unconstitutionally interferes
with personal and property rights and with the freedom of business enter-
prisers to operate their businesses as they want to operate them, that it
unconstitutionally delegates Congressional power to the President and to
others, that it involves invasions by the federal government of fields re-
served by the Constitution to state control. Learned articles have ap-
peared in several legal periodicals discussing in detail constitutional ques-
tions raised by these contentions. It is not the purpose of this paper to
deal with them in detail. Biut I shall discuss each of the three types of
questions separately, attempting to show, in the light of the foregoing ex-
position of the judicial process in constitutional cases, what will be, as
to each, the r6le of the document, of doctrine, of the judges.
Attacks of the first type-contentions that the Constitution guarantees
a minimum of individualism, that its mandate with respect to govern-
mental control of business is laissez-faire, and that the recovery legisla-
tion violates that guaranty and that mandate-are based wholly upon
the doctrines (and decisions applying them) announced by the judges in
the exercise of the authority which they have claimed, during the past half
century, is conferred upon them by the due process clauses. These at-
tacks invoke neither the words of the document nor doctrines deducible
by construction or interpretation (in any true sense of those words) from
it; they invoke solely the doctrines which I have called the third part of
the Constitution. To substantiate the position I have taken that these
doctrines are wholly the result of the judges' statesmanship and not at all
the result of construction or interpretation of the document in any true
sense, I shall, before discussing the due process attacks upon the recovery
legislation, attempt a review of so much of constitutional history as is
necessary for a full understanding of the power claimed by the judges
under the due process clauses.
TiE HISTORY OF THE JUDGES' POwER tUNDER THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
I
The initial assumption by the judges of power to declare statutes un-
constitutional is not adequately accounted for, as Mr. Chief justice
Marshall asserted it to be, by the mere fact that there was a written
Constitution. 9 In France a written constitution did not lead to judicial
19 Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch (U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 6o (1803). For a critical consideration
of the reasoning of Marshall, C. J., see Gibson, J., in Eakin v. Raub, 12 S.& R. (Pa.) 330 , 345 ff.
(1825). Cf. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
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review of the constitutional validity of statutes. When the Constitution
was adopted it was not generally accepted that law is a command of a
political superior to a political inferior; the notion that law is that which
commands the right, that law is discoverable, not made by human beings,
was widely accepted. This identification of "ought" with "is" has a long
history. Natural law, natural rights, deriving from Greek and Roman
thought, persisting throughout and beyond the middle ages, have often
meant more than "ought-to-be-law" or "ought-to-be-rights"; at many
times throughout antiquity and the middle ages it was asserted that
any human enactment violating natural law was not binding.2o The
colonists had cited Coke's claim of power for the courts to nullify Acts of
Parliament contrary to "right reason" in support of their refusal to
recognize English statutes hurtful to their pocket books. It is in the light
of these ideas and of the then prevalent social compact theory, of Cicero,
Grotius, Puffendorf, and Locke, that the Declaration of Independence
with its inalienable rights is to be interpreted.21 Impressed as they were
with Montesquieu's notion that the judiciary was a branch of government
codrdinate with the legislature, it is easy to understand why the judges
seized upon the written Constitution as empowering them to nullify
statutes which they thought infringed the rights to secure which govern-
ment was instituted.22
In the period imiaediately following the adoption of the Federal Con-
stitution, the really doubtful question was whether, in addition to in-
validating statutes which they thought violative of constitutional pro-
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893), Thayer, Legal Essays (i9o8), i. That the written Constitution
expressly authorizes the judges to declare statutes unconstitutional, see McGovney, Review
of Haines: American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, 21 Cal. L. Rev. 637, 639-41 (933).
20 On natural law and natural rights, see Ritchie, Natural Rights, (1894), Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 365
(1928-9), and Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (930).
21 See, in general, Becker, The Declaration of Independence (1922).
- The historical basis of the power of American judges to declare statutes unconstitutional
is indicated accurately by the opinion of Mr. Justice Patterson, on circuit, in Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas (U.S.) 3o4, i L.Ed. 391 (795) holding void a Pennsylvania
statute. After expounding the theory that the judiciary was co6rdinate with, not subordinate
to, the legislature and referring to a vague clause in the State Constitution, he said: "The
preservation of property, then, is a primary object of the social compact and, by the .... con-
stitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law.... [An] act divesting one citizen of
his freehold, and vesting it in another, without a just compensation .... is inconsistent with
the principles of reason, justice, and moral rectitude; it is incompatible with the comfort, peace,
and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the principles of social alliance in every free govern-
ment; and, lastly, it is contrary both to the letter and spirit of the constitution. In short, it is
what every one would think unreasonable and unjust in his own case." 2 Dallas, 3io.
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visions, the judges would nullify statutes which were inconsistent with
their conceptions of natural law and natural rights. In i798, in delivering
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 23 Mr. justice Chase,
by dictum, unequivocally claimed for the judges power to do this; Mr.
Justice Iredell delivered a separate opinion protesting against the assump-
tion of such power.24 Iredell's rebuke did not silence the adherents of
natural law. In 18io, in Fletcher v. Peck 2 5 the Supreme Court held invalid
a Georgia statute revoking a land grant, which had been procured by
fraud, after the land had been bought by an innocent purchaser. Mr.
Chief justice Marshall stretched the impairment clause to cover the
case.26 But he did not place the decision upon the written Constitution
23 3 Dallas (U.S.) 386, I L.Ed. 648 (1798).
24 Mr. Justice Chase said: "I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or
that it is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained
by the constitution or fundamental law of the state. The people of the United States erected
their constitutions or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare,
to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence. The
purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social
compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the
proper objects of it. The nature and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This
fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no
man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the
laws permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legislature cannot do, without exceeding
their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which
will determine and overrule apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private
property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the legislature
(for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments
established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the na-
ture of the power of which it is founded." 3 Dallas (U.S.) 387-8.
To which Mr. Justice Iredell answered: "It is true, that some speculative jurists have held,
that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that any
court of justice would possess a power to declare it so ..... If any act of congress, or of the
legislature of a state, violates constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I ad-
mit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the court will nev-
er resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the legislature
of the Union, or the legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general
scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because
it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural jus-
tice are regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject; and all the court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the legislature
(possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which in the opinion of the judges
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice." 3 Dallas (U.S.) 398-9.
25S 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 3 L.Ed. z62 (18io).
2 He held that a grant was a contract and that the clause (Article I, Section Io, Clause i:
"No State shall .... pass any .... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts") covered
not only contracts between individuals but also contracts between a state and an individual.
Why the clause forbade the state to exercise against an innocent purchaser with whom it had
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alone; he expressed doubt whether the Georgia Constitution's grant of
"legislative power" to the state legislature authorized the revoking
statute-whether power to enact such a statute could be said to be in the
nature of "legislative power"-and he definitely held, as an alternative
ground of decision, that the revoking statute was void under "general
principles which are common to our free institutions. ' '27 Mr. Justice
Johnson, unwilling to stretch the impairment clause as his brethren had
done, placed his concurrence in the decision solely on this ground-in his
own words, "on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things;
a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity.' '2S Flekher v. Peck,
nevertheless, really marks the end of the judges' open avowal of power to
nullify statutes not violative of the written Constitution because incon-
sistent with their conceptions of natural law. For it showed the avail-
ability, so far as state statutes were concerned, of the impairment clause
as a peg for the views of Marshall and his federalist associates as to the
sanctity of property rights.29 That clause was extended still further; it
became the basis for the doctrine that state legislatures may not impair
vested rights. 30 This doctrine did not forbid all impairments of vested
rights; in effect, it forbade only unreasonable impairments of them3"-in
other words it forbade impairments worked by statutes inconsistent with
the judges' conceptions of natural law.
The necessity of finding for invaded rights an origin which could be
called "contractual," even in the broad sense that Marshall gave to that
term, restricted the availability of the impairment clause as a peg for the
invalidation of statutes upon the basis of natural law. As Jacksonian
Democrats were appointed, Marshall gradually lost control of the Court
and the veto power exercised by the judges under the impairment clause
at first ceased to expand and finally began to contract. In 1827, the Chief
Justice and his never-failing adherent, Mr. Justice Story, were able to
muster but one other of the Court's seven members to vote in favor of
Webster's contention that the impairment clause should be extended so
not contracted a right to rescind which it surely did not prevent the state from exercising
against the fraudulent grantee, the opinion does not make clear.
276 Cranch (U.S.) I35-6, i39 (18io). 28 6 Cranch (U.S.) I43 (i8io).
29 The impairment clause was the only possible peg for such views. The ex post facto clause
(Article I, Section xo, Clause r) had been held to apply only to statutes relating to criminal
offenses. Calder v. Bull, supra note 23. Until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
i868, the Constitution contained no due process clause applicable to the States.
30 See Corwin, A Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247
(1914).
3t Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 627, 7 L.Ed. 542 (I829).
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as to serve as a peg for natural law objections to state bankruptcy laws
applicable to debts contracted after their enactment.3 2 In 1833, Marshall
conceded that nothing in the Federal Constitution prevented a state from
taking private property for public use without compensation.3 3 After
Marshall's death, in 1837, the Supreme Court, under Taney's leadership,
cut down the availability of the impairment clause by the adoption of
the rule that public grants must be construed strictly against the gran-
tee. 34 Until several decades after the Civil War, state legislation was
not subject to invalidation by the Supreme Court upon the ground that
it was inconsistent with natural law or invaded natural rights, i.e., that
it was unreasonable. 35
II
Today, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments36 are held to render invalid all statutes, whether relating to pro-
cedure or substantive law, which the judges deem to be violative of
natural law or natural rights. The words "life," "liberty," and "property"
in those clauses have been given such extended meanings that every
statute adversely affecting an individual is held to deprive him of one or
the other of them. Whether or not a statute is valid depends, therefore,
wholly upon whether it is "law," within the meaning of that word as it is
used in the due process clauses. And it is "law" only if the judges deem
it to be not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable-i.e., not inconsistent
with their conceptions of natural law, not violative of what they deem to be
fundamental, or natural, rights. The subsidiary doctrines which have been
laid down under the due process clauses are nothing more or less than the
judges' versions of natural law, of natural rights. The Taney court's limi-
tation of Marshall's impairment clause doctrines was of no avail. The Su-
3- Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 212, 6 L.Ed. 6o 5 (1827). The Court had held befor6
this, in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat (U.S.) 122, 4 L.Ed. 529 (iSi), that the impairment
clause did forbid the application of state bankruptcy laws to debts contracted before their
enactment.
33 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). This is the leading case on the
proposition that the first eight Amendments limit the federal government only, not the states.
The Fifth Amendment does forbid such a taking.
34 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ii Pet. (U.S.) 420, 9 L.Ed. 773 (1837).
35 Mr. Justice Story's chagrin and determination to resign because "the doctrines and opin-
ions of the 'old Court' were daily losing ground, .... especially those on great constitutional
questions .... so vital to the country" are expressed by him in a letter to Ezekiel Bacon on
April 12, 1845, printed in Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story (85i), 527.
36 The Fifth Amendment, adopted in 1791, applicable to the federal government only, pro-
vides that "No person shall .... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in i868, provides that "No State shall ....
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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preme Court's final position gives it more power than even Marshall
claimed for it; in all but theory, Mr. Justice Chase's claim of power for the
judges to invalidate statutes not violative of the provisions of the written
Constitution but inconsistent with the judges' conceptions of natural law
and natural rights37 has won out. How did this occur?
Most of the o'iginal state constitutions contained clauses forbidding
deprivations of life, liberty, or property otherwise than by the law of the
land. These clauses, copied after chapter 39 of Magna Charta, sometimes
substituted "without due process of law" for "otherwise than by the law
of the land." With one or two exceptions,3 these clauses were held by the
state courts at first to be, not restrictions upon the legislature, but merely
directions that executive and judicial action must be in accordance with
law, i.e., either the common law or the law enacted by the legislature.
Later they came to be regarded as limitations upon legislative power to
alter and prescribe modes of procedure.39 Finally, there was a revival in
some state courts of the practice, already abandoned by the Supreme
Court of the United States, of overthrowing statutes on natural law
grounds. The state constitutions' grants of "legislative power" to state
legislatures were said to embrace only the power to tax, the power of
eminent domain, and the "police power." As a New York judge put it in
1843, the power delegated to the legislature by the clause granting it legis-
lative power does not "reach the life, liberty, or property of a citizen
.... when the sacrifice is not demanded by a just regard for the public
welfare"41--i.e., by what the judges deem to be a just regard for the pub-
lic welfare. The next step, an assertion that the law of the land and the
due process clauses were a mandate to the judges to protect persons and
property against unreasonable laws, was a short one. 4' This construction
of the state constitutions' due process and law of the land clauses was far
from universal and was not unchallenged,42 but it was stated as settled
37 Note 24, supra. Neither Chase, J., nor the later justices have invoked the Ninth Amend-
ment (which reads "The Enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people") although a plausible argument in
favor of judicial protection of natural rights might be constructed from it.
38 E.g., Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, i Murphey (N.C.) 58 (18o5).
39 See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev.
366, 460 (igrI).
40 Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N.Y.) i4o, 144 (1843).
41 In Taylor v. Porter, supra note 4o , the due process clause was invoked as an alternative
ground of decision. In Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (854) the restrictive interpretation
of the state constitution's grant of legislative power was abandoned, the due process clause
relied upon as the sole ground of decision.
42 See Corwin, supra note 39.
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law, elaborated, and whole-heartedly approved by Judge Cooley in his
Constitutional Limitations. This work, published in 1868, the year of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was for forty years at least the
standard lawyer's and law student's text on constitutional law and was
constantly cited and relied upon by the courts.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendmep.t, -applicahle to the
federal government, had received no such construction when it was copied
by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and inserted in what became,
in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment. It was thought by Mr. Justice
Story in 1833 to relate to modes of procedure only. 43 It had been invoked
in but two cases, one in 1855 and another in 1857, and these cases had
done nothing to clarify its meaning. 44 What, if any, limitation on the
power of state legislatures, its framers, the Congress which proposed it,
and the state legislatures which ratified it, intended the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to have has never been and prob-
ably never can be ascertained. 4.
It was twenty years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
before the view that its due process clause authorized the judges to in-
validate all statutes they thought to be arbitrary and unreasonable
finally prevailed. In the end that view was asserted not only with respect
to the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment but also with
43 Story on the Constitution (1847 ed.), 233. His language is: ...... this clause, in effect,
affirms the right of trial, according to the process and proceedings of the common law." In all,
he devotes ten lines of a 35o page volume to the due process clause.
44 The two cases are Den dem. Murray v. The Hoboken Land, etc., Co., 18 How. (U.S.)
272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1855) and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393, x5 L.Ed.
691 (1857). The former held that the Fifth Amendment due process clause did not prevent
seizure of property of a federal tax collector and sale thereof to pay a sum found by the
United States auditor to be due the United States, without a judicial proceeding or hearing of
any kind, on the ground that there was historical warrant for such a summary procedure in
such a case. In the Dred Scott Case, Taney, C. J., voting to hold void the Missouri Compro-
mise, briefly referred to the due process clause as a ground of decision in addition to those he
developed at length (ig How. 450). Only two justices concurred in the opinion of Taney, C. J.
Curtis, J., dissenting, insisted that such a construction of the due process clause would not
"bear examination" (ig How. 626). The other justices did not mention the due process clause.
No federal statute was invalided by the Court on the basis of the Fifth Amendment due
process clause until, in 19o8, Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 16x, 52 L.Ed. 436, 28 Sup. Ct.
277, was decided. Cf., however, Dred Scott v. Sanford, supra, and the first Legal Tender
Case, infra, text and note 48, in both of which the clause was cited as a makeweight.
45 See Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (igo8); Kendrick, The journal of
the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (1914). Kendrick relies upon assertions
made by a member of the committee (Conklin) in 1882 as counsel in the argument of San Mateo
County v. Southern Pacific Co., i16 U.S. 138, 29 L.Ed. 589, 6 Sup. Ct. 317 (1885), that the due
process clause was intended to protect individuals and corporations against oppressive state
legislation.
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respect to that in the Fifth Amendment. Widespread acceptance of the
views of state court judges in the forties and fifties given currency by
Judge Cooley's universally read treatise, the rapid industrialization of the
country and the never-ending advocacy of able counsel employed by
corporations and individuals of great wealth and economic power to com-
bat statutes regulating industry,46 the convictions and dominating per-
sonality of Mr. Justice Field,47 the judges' fright at the Granger and
Populist movements and other rumblings of discontent-these are some
of the influences which contributed to the result.
The development was marked by aberrations. It began with the first
Legal Tender Case,4" decided in 1870, which held invalid, by a vote of four
to three, the federal Legal Tender Act. Among other grounds of in-
validity, the majority cited, as a makeweight, the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The invocation of this clause because of the al-
leged injustice of the law was denounced by Mr. Justice Miller as sub-
stituting "our ideas of policy for judicial construction, an undefined code
of ethics for the Constitution, and a court of justice for the national legis-
lature." 49 Two years later, the decision was overruled; Mr. Justice Field,
now in dissent, not only disagreed with Miller's interpretation of the due
process clause but went further and, quoting the language of Mr. Justice
Chase in Calder v. Bull in 1798, reiterated the latter's claim for the judges
of power to invalidate unjust laws even though they violated no provision
of the written Constitution.so In 1874, in Loan Association v. Topeka,s'"
with only one justice protesting, the Supreme Court did invalidate, on
natural law grounds, without reference to the Fourteenth Amendment or
any other provision of the written Constitution, a Kansas statute author-
izing a city to donate money to a manufacturing concern to encourage it
4See Lemer, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 Yale L. Jour. 668 (i933).
47 See Nelles, Review of Swisher: Stephen J. Field-Craftsman of the Law (x930), 40 Yale
L. Jour. 998 (193). In general, see Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 7 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (19o9); Corwin, Social Planning under the Constitution-A Study
in Perspectives, 26 American Political Science Review 1 (1932).
4" Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603, 29 L.Ed. 513 (187o).
498 Wall (U.S.) 637-8 (1870).
so Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 2o L.Ed. 287 (1870). Mr. Justice Field's claim of
power in the judges to invalidate laws upon extra-constitutional bases occurs at p. 670.
Allegations that the overruling of the first Legal Tender Case was the result of a "packing"
of the Court are discussed and doubted in Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States
(1928), 51 ff.
s'20 Wall. (U.S.) 6S5, 22 L.Ed. 455 (r874). Clifford, J., dissenting, protested that"Errors of
indiscretion which the legislature may commit in the exercise of the power it possesses cannot
be corrected by the courts, for the reason that the courts cannot adjudge an act of the legisla-
ture void unless it is in violation of the Federal or State constitution." 20 Wall. 668.
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to establish its works in the city. The opinion (written not by Field but
by Miller!) invokes limitations upon the powers of legislatures "which
grow out of the essential nature of all free governments," "implied reser-
vations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not
exist"; from them it deduces a rule that taxation must be for purposes
deemed by the judges to be "public."-- But in most of the cases before
1885, Field's views were expressed in dissenting opinions. The Fourteenth
Amendment was first invoked in 1873 in the Slaughter House Cases.-"
The majority, over the dissent of Field and three other justices, who relied
more upon the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 4 than upon its due process clause, held that the grant of a monopoly
to certain butchers in New Orleans did not infringe the constitutional
rights of other butchers; they insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not intended to make the United States Supreme Court "a perpetual
censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own
citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent
with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this
amendment." 5 Again, in Munn v. Illinoiss6 and several companion cases, 7
decided in 1877, it was held, over Field's vehement dissents, that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent a state from fixing the rates to
52 20 Wall. (U.S.) 662-3. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 616 (1877), Mr.
Justice Miller perhaps accounts for the seeming inconsistency of his Hepburn v. Griswold
opinion (supra text and note 49) and his Loan Association v. Topeka opinion. In refusing, on
writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, to invalidate a drainage assessment which he
finds not prohibited by the federal Constitution, he says: "It may possibly violate some of
those principles of general constitutional law, of which we could take jurisdiction were we sit-
ting in review of a Circuit Court of the United States, as we were in Loan Association v. Tope-
ka." 96 U.S. ioS .
The doctrine of Loan Association v. Topeka has long been subsumed under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, i8 Cal. L.
Rev. 137, 241 (1930).
S3 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).
s4 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States." The majority, in rendering this clause nugatory by holding
it to guarantee only rights already guaranteed by other clauses of the Constitution, probably
indulged in judicial nullification. The clause, it is fairly certain, was intended (in connection
with the enforcement power granted to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment) to increase
federal legislative power. See Kendrick, note 45 supra, passim, and McGovney, Privileges or
Immunities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment, 4 Iowa L. Bull. 219 (1918).
s9 16 Wall. .(U.S.) 78. Again it is Miller, J., who speaks thus.
5 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877).
s5 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 24 L.Ed. 94 (I877); Peik v. Chicago, etc.,
R-y. Co., 94 U.S. 164, 24 L.Ed. 97 (5877); Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. x79,
24 L.Ed. 99 (1877); Winona, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 18o, 24 L.Ed. 99 (5877); Stone v.
Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 24 L.Ed. 102 (x877).
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be charged not only by railroads but also by grain elevator operators and
that when the state had fixed such rates, the Court had no power to re-
view their reasonableness and to invalidate them if the judges thought
them too low to yield a fair return on the property of the owner. But
Field's dissents persisted. Majority opinions, although upholding ques-
tioned statutes, began to meet him on his own ground, began to attempt
to demonstrate the reasonableness of the statutes. In 1898, in Smyth v.
Ames, s5 the railroad attorneys finally persuaded the Court to overrule
the decision in Munn v. Illinois that the reasonableness of legislatively
fixed rates was not subject to judicial review. Field's view of the power
of the Supreme Court under the due process clauses had finally become
unquestioned law.5 9
III
In the past decade, constitutional theory as to the power claimed by
the judges under the due process clause has been simplified. Until then,
there was much talk of the "police power." State statutes interfering with
life, liberty, or property were said to be valid under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment only if they were exercises of the power to
tax, the power of eminent domain, or the "police power."'6 ° Countless
attempts were made to define, or rather describe, the "police power."
For a time there was controversy as to whether it extended only to the
protection of the peace, good order, morals, and health of the community,
or also to the promotion of the general welfare. There were disputes as to
whether or not the federal government possessed "police power." By a
S8 169 U.S. 466, 42 L.Ed. 8ig, I8 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
s9 Occasional questionings do occur in the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice
Brandeis. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 71 L.Ed. 1095,47 Sup. Ct. 641, 373 (1927) the
latter said: "Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law
as well as to matters of procedure." Cf. the view of Mr. Justice Story, note 43, supra. In Bald-
win v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595, 74 L.Ed. io56, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930). Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting, said: "As the decisions now stand I can see hardly any limit but the sky to the in-
validation of [the constitutional rights of the States] if they happen to strike a majority of this
Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions.
Yet I can think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present and the earlier
decisions to which I have referred. Of course the words 'due process of law,' if taken in their
literal meaning, have no application to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they have
been given a more extended and artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great
caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow to
construe the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide
the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the States may pass."
6 See Field, J., dissenting, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877).
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curious confusion of ideas, it was suggested that Congress's power to tax
was not subject to the limitation of reasonableness held to be created by
the Fifth Amendment due process clause.6' Now the term "police power"
is obsolescent. The considerations formerly held to determine whether or
not a statute was "within the police power" are now held to go to "rea-
sonableness" and the due process clauses are held to require that every
exercise of any governmental power, whether the general governmental
powers retained by the states or the special powers delegated to the
federal government, be reasonable. The extra term is being dropped.6'
Distinct bodies of doctrine have been developed concerned with what
statutes dealing with particular subjects-e.g., procedure, taxation, regu-
lation of business-are reasonable and therefore "law" within the due
process clauses.
To say, as I have said, that in creating these doctrines, in determining
their content, the judges have been wholly free to act as statesmen does
not disclose the influences which have induced the judges to pronounce
the particular doctrines which they have pronounced. Negatively, it does
assert that those doctrines have not been derived from the words of the
document. It implies the part played by the accidental presence upon
the Court of men with definite views as to what institutions the country
should have, as to what existing institutions must be left unaltered if the
country is to persist. On the other hand, the prevailing American emo-
tional attachments to the "historical rights of Englishmen," to "Anglo-
Saxon" traditions of individual liberty and individual rights, to American
customs and institutions, would have been reflected in doctrine and
decision whatever men had been upon the Court.63
Here, as elsewhere in constitutional law today, it is of the utmost sig-
nificance that some of the judges, at least, are becoming increasingly un-
willing to veto Congressional legislation upon the basis of their own or
their predecessors' wisdom. This fact is peculiarly important here be-
cause so much of existing due process doctrine embodies tests which do
little -more than direct the judge to decide cases as he thinks they ought
to be decided.
6, White, C. J., in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. i, 24, 6o L.Ed. 493,
36 Sup. Ct. 236 (1916). Federal tax statutes have since been held invalid because in violation
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 76 L.Ed.
772, 52 Sup. Ct. 358 (1932), and other cases. Cf. however, the language of Sutherland, J., in
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 54 Sup. Ct. 599 (1934).
62 It is used but once by Roberts, J., in Nebbia v. New York, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (2934).
63 See supra note 15. This, of course, is also true as to doctrine pronounced by the judges in
interpreting the words of the written Constitution.
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THE RECOVERY LEGISLATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Unprecedentedly drastic limitations upon the liberty of business enter-
prisers to operate their businesses as they want to operate them are im-
posed by the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act and the subordinate legislation (the codes, etc.) author-
ized by them. The Securities Act and the banking and railroad legisla-
tion also constitute far-reaching extensions of governmental control over
business. The calling in of gold coin, the reduction of the gold content of
the dollar, and the annulment of the gold clauses in private and public
contracts are striking interferences with the liberty and property of indi-
viduals. The expenditure of public funds for relief of banks, of industry,
of farmers, of homeowners, of the unemployed entails the exaction of
money from taxpayers for unwonted uses.
One thing is certain. No clause of the written Constitution and no doc-
trine deducible by construction or interpretation therefrom prevents gov-
ernment from thus regulating business, from thus interfering with the
liberty or property of individuals or corporations. The document and doc-
trines thus deducible therefrom furnish no basis for claims that the man-
date of the Constitution with respect to governmental control of business
is laissez-faire. So far as they are concerned, the Constitution permits the
adoption of any form of relationship between government and business.
The document does guarantee certain fairly clearly defined individual
rights,64 but it is clear that the recovery legislation does not infringe the
rights thus guaranteed.5 Its constitutionality (apart from questions of
the delegation of legislative power and of federal government interference
in fields reserved to the states, which are considered later) depends wholly
upon the "third part" of the Constitution-the due process doctrines
which derive not at all from the document. I shall attempt to state the
principal questions which are likely to be raised and to indicate the ex-
tent to which their decision will depend upon the statesmanship of the
Supreme Court justices.
I
That a statute expending funds derived from taxation is invalid unless
the purpose of the expenditure is deemed by the judges to be a "public
purpose" was first announced as a limitation upon government growing
64 E.g., the right to jury trial in the federal courts and the other rights guaranteed by the
first eight amendments. See also Article I, Section 9.
6S A possible contention that the calling in of gold violates the provision of Amendment V
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation" is con-
sidered infra note 71.
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out of "the essential nature of all free governments";66 later the doctrine
was subsumed under the due process clause. Phrased as it is, this is one
of the doctrines which involve a test that does little more than direct
the judges to decide as statesmen would. Past decisions have upheld most
questioned expenditures. 67
So far as most of the statutes comprising the recovery legislation which
authorize the expenditure of public funds are concerned, there is no way
in which the constitutional question whether the expenditure is for a pub-
lic purpose can'be brought before the Court. The statutes under which the
federal government has lent or given money to banks, industry, farmers,
homeowners, the unemployed do not compel action or penalize non-action
by anyone other than the taxpayers from whom the money distributed is
exacted. Except for the proceeds of the processing taxes, the funds ex-
pended are funds raised by general taxes. And the Supreme Court has
held that a taxpayer has too remote and slight an interest in funds raised
by general taxation to be entitled to question the validity of statutes
authorizing their expenditure.68 Nor can a state, as parens patriae of its
citizen taxpayers, question such statutes.69
The money turned over to farmers under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act is raised by a special tax-the processing tax. Persons from whom it
is exacted, therefore, do have a sufficient interest to question whether it
is being expended for what the judges deem to be a "public purpose."
The answer to that question, it is obvious, will depend wholly upon the
statesmanship of the judges.70
II
The calling in of gold coin and payment therefor of a smaller number of
paper dollars than could be procured for the gold were there a free market,
the reduction in the gold content of the dollar, the annulment of the gold
clause in private and public contracts raise questions so unlike any ques-
tion upon which the Supreme Court has ruled in the past, that no relevant
due process doctrines or decisions exist. Consequently, the test of valid-
ity is the fundamental due process test-are the statutes, in view of needs
to meet which they were enacted, arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable
6 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U.S.) 655, 22 L.Ed. 455 (1874).
67 They are collected in McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, i8 Cal. L. Rev. 137, 241
(1930).
68 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486, 67 L.Ed. 1078, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
69 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 67 L.Ed. 1078, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923).
70 For analysis of the question and discussion of the cases, see Brewster, Is the Processing
Tax Unconstitutional, 19 American Bar Association Journal, 419 (1933).
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or does their tendency to advance the public welfare outweigh the burdens
they impose upon individuals. In the invalidation of statutes by reason
of this test the judges must determine how far it is wise for them to go in
preferring their own views of policy if they differ from those of Congress;
in the application of such a test, statesmanship alone is called for.7'
III
Some of the extensions of government control over industry are, it is
clear in view of existing doctrine and past decisions, unlikely to be held
invalid under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Securi-
ties Act, the Act providing for the insurance of bank deposits, and the
Emergency Banking Act (which provides for limitations on banking and
foreign exchange transactions) are similar to and are little if any more
drastic interferences in the field of private enterprise than statutes which
the Court has upheld in the past.72
There remain for consideration the attacks which will be made upon
the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment
Act and the subordinate legislation thereunder. These Acts and the codes
and licenses which to date have been promulgated under them contain
provisions, binding upon some or all industries, which can be grouped
under four heads: labor provisions, price-fixing provisions, production-
limitation provisions, miscellaneous trade practice provisions.
Hours of work are limited, minimum wages are fixed, child labor is
forbidden, employers are prohibited from interfering with their workmen's
freedom of organization, a variety of regulations of working conditions
are imposed. Past decisions, based upon the fundamental due process
tests of reasonableness, of balancing the social gain against the restrictions
71 The impairment clause (Article i, Section io, Clause i), of course, has no application to
federal governmental action. If it did apply, existing doctrine would make validity depend
upon the statesmanship of the judges. Hughes, C. J., said in Home Building and Loan Associa-
tion v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934) that "The economic interests of the
State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstand-
ing interference with contracts."
It will perhaps be contended that the gold coin called in is being "taken for public use"
within the Fifth Amendment and that "just compensation" is not being made. There is no
relevant past decision or doctrine. Decision either way is within the limits upon judicial states-
manship fixed by the words of the clause in the document. See, in general, note, 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 479 (1934); United States v. Campbell, 5 F. Supp. 156 (i933) and note thereon, 34
Col. L. Rev. i66 (x934); Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Contracts, 42 Yale L. Jour.
1051 (1933); Post and Willard, The Power of Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses, 46 Harv. L.
Rev. X225 (1933); Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, i9 Corn. L. Quar.
(i933).
72See the collection of cases upholding regulatory statutes in Nebbia v. New York, 54
Sup. Ct. 505, 511 ff. (i934).
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upon liberty and property rights, make it practically certain that all of
the regulations of working conditions, the prohibition of child labor, and
the limitation of hours of work will be upheld.73 Past decisions invalidat-
ing the outlawry of yellow dog contracts74 have recently been overruled
in effect by a decision 75 which renders practically certain the upholding of
the prohibition against interference by employers with the freedom of
organization of employees. The fixing of minimum wages is the only labor
regulation the upholding of which is at all doubtful. A 1923 decision by
a narrowly divided Court held invalid the fixing of minimum wages for
women7 6 Criticism of the holding has been almost entirely adverse.77
The N.I.R.A. codes will not raise the question whether the 1923 decision
should be overruled. Not only have conditions changed, but the social
gains sought to be achieved are very different from those sought by the
statute invalidated in 1923. Then the tendency, if any, of a local mini-
mum wage to protect and promote the health and morals of women was
held by five of the justices not to outweigh the interference with freedom
involved. Whether a nation-wide minimum wage for men as well as
women, intended not only to benefit the workers but also to benefit indus-
try as a whole by creating, through increased purchasing power of the
workers, a better market for the products of industry, is reasonable is a
very different question-a question the answering of which involves
statesmanship alone.
Prices for petroleum and for milk are now fixed directly; indirectly, the
prices for certain agricultural products are sought to be raised by the
processing tax; sales below cost or below a fair market value or below pub-
lished price lists are forbidden in certain industries75 When this regula-
73 As to working conditions, citation of authority seems unnecessary in view of the multi-
tude of statutes of unquestioned validity relating to the safety, health, and comfort of workers.
Cf. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 46 L.Ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. I (igoi), upholding
statute regulating the issuance of store orders for wages.
As to child labor, see Sturges & Burn v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 58 L.Ed. 245,34 Sup. Ct.
6o (1913).
As to hours of work, see Bunting v. Oregon, 243.U.S. 426, 6i L.Ed. 830, 37 Sup. Ct. 435
(1917). Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 68 L.Ed. 69o, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924), upheld the
prohibition of night work by women.
74 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. i6r, 52 L.Ed. 436, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (r9o8); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 59 L.Ed. 441, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).
75 Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 281 U.S. 548, 74 L.Ed. 1034, 50 Sup. Ct. 427
(1930).
76 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 67 L.Ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
7 See, The Supreme Court and Minimum Wage Legislation: Comment by the Legal Pro-
fession on the District of Columbia Case (1925).
78 On the last mentioned prohibition, see Terborgh, Price Control Devices in N.R.A. Codes
(1934)-
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tion was undertaken, doctrine invalidated governmental price fixing
except in businesses "affected with a public interest" or "clothed with a
public use." No satisfactory definition of these phrases had been formu-
lated; in reality they were labels used after the judges, as statesmen, had
decided to permit price fixing in a particular business.9 Now this doc-
trine has been repudiated. Over the dissent of Justices McReynolds, Van
Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler, the fixing of prices for milk by the
State of New York was upheld on March 5, 1934, by Chief Justice
Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo.o Writing
the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts said: "The phrase 'affected
with a public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than
that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public
good.' ' 8 The sub-doctrine repudiated, the fundamental due process test
of reasonableness is all that is left. Constitutionality depends upon the
judges.
In the petroleum and lumber industries maximum production figures
are set for each industry as a whole and quotas are allocated to individual
producers; in the cotton and wool textile industries the number of hours
of plant activity is limited; before the capacity of existing plants in the
cotton textile, lace, ice, and some other industries may be increased, the
equivalent of a certificate of public convenience and advantage must be
procured. The only past decision relevant to the validity of these regula-
tions is New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.12 There it was held by six of the
justices (the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts voting with the four
who constituted the minority in the New York milk case) that the require-
ment of a certificate of public convenience and advantage as a prerequisite
to entrance into a business was permissible only in the case of businesses
"affected with a public interest" and that the ice business in Oklahoma
was not so affected. The Milk Case undermines this decision. Much of
Mr. Justice Roberts's language in the latter case is reminiscent of Mr.
Justice Brandeis's already classic dissent in the Ice Case. 3 It seems cer-
79In dissenting opinions, Mr. Justice Stone had pointed this out and had suggested a mean-
ingful test. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 447, 71 L.Ed. 718, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927); Ribnik
v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359, 72 L.Ed. 913, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928). See McAllister, Lord
Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759 (930); Hamilton,
Affectation with Public Interest, 39 Yale L.. Jour. io89 (i93o).
80 Nebbia v. New York, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (934).
" 54 Sup. Ct. 515-516. Such a holding was called for in Carpenter, The Constitutionality
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 125, 141 0934)-
82 285 U.S. 262, 76 L.Ed. 747, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
8 Because its bearing is so wide, a long quotation from Mr. Justice Roberts's opinion seems
justified. I omit his citation of cases.
.... there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the
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tain that the Court as at present constituted will regard all regulations as
to limitation of production and entry into business as subject only to the
fundamental due process test of reasonableness. Again constitutionality
depends upon the statesmanship of the judges, upon the extent to which
they will prefer their own views of policy if they differ from those of
Congress and the agencies to which Congress has delegated power to
make these regulations.
The trade practices outlawed by the codes are practices some of which
are regarded as injurious to consumers, some as injurious to competitors.
No past decisions lay down doctrines particularizing the general due
process test.
Due process decisions in the past, and the doctrines announced in them,
gave some basis for claims that the Constitution's mandate with respect
to governmental control of business was laissez-faire. But so many regu-
state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the
products or commodities it sells.
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitu-
tional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.
The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislative arm, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. 'Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome
rule for trade and commerce is an economic question which this court need not consider or de-
termine.' Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337-8. And it is equally clear
that if the legislative policy be to curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures
which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the
rule is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of
the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ....
"The law-making bodies have in the past endeavored to promote free competition by laws
aimed at trusts and monopolies. The consequent interference with private property and free-
dom of contract has not availed with the courts to set these enactments aside as denying due
process. Where the public interest was deemed to require the fixing of minimum prices, that
expedient has been sustained. If the law-making body within its sphere of government con-
cludes that the conditions or practices in an industry make unrestricted competition an inade-
quate safeguard of the consumer's interests, produce waste harmful to the public, threaten
ultimately to cut off the supply of a commodity needed by the public, or portend thi destruc-
tion of the industry itself, appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort to correct the
threatened consequences may not be set aside because the regulation adopted fixes prices rea-
sonably deemed by the legislature to be fair to those engaged in the industry and to the con-
suming public. And this is especially so where, as here, the economic maladjustment is one of
price, which threatens harm to the producer at one end of the series and the consumer at the
other. The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such
fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group of the people.
Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discrim-
inatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty. ...."54 Sup. Ct. 56-517.
CONSTITUTION AND RECOVERY LEGISLATION
latory statutes have been upheld, so many invalidating decisions over-
ruled and doctrines repudiated, that there is today no basis for such
claims. Moreover, doctrine at all times has been so phrased that any
regulatory statute would be upheld if the judges thought the public inter-
est involved was great enough to outweigh the interference with liberty
and property involved. The r6le of the judges far overshadows the r6le of
doctrine; the words of the document have never, in this field, played any
part.84
THE REcovERY LEGISLATION AND THE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Many of the statutes which comprise the recovery legislation delegate
legislative power to the President or to others. The N.I.R.A. codes are
the most conspicuous example of the subordinate legislation which Con-
gress has authorized.
The document does not expressly forbid the delegation of legislative
power by Congress. Article I, Section I, provides that "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."
The judges have derived from these words, by construction and interpre-
tation, a doctrine that legislative power is non-delegable. But, Congress
has delegated important legislative powers to the President and to others
many times. A number of these delegations have been questioned; none
has ever been invalidated."5 The delegations upheld have been labeled
delegations of "quasi-legislative power" only.
The truth is that the complexity of the problems with which legisla-
tures must deal today, the need for the particularization of general
policies and for the formulation and frequent readjustment of subordinate
policies and specific rules by informed experts, has made subordinate
54 Questions as to sufficiency of notice and hearing before administrative action is taken and
as to the extent of judicial review of administrative determinations involve doctrines referable
to Article III as well as to the due process clause. Here, as elsewhere, neither document nor
existing doctrines or past decisions limit greatly the statesmanship of the judges. See Fuchs,
The Constitutionality of the Recovery Program, ig St. Louis L. Rev. i, i8 ff. (1933); note, 43
Yale L. Jour. 599 (x934).
8S The President empowered to lower tariff rates, Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L.Ed. 294,
12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1892). Secretary of Treasury, to define and exclude impure tea, Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 48 L.Ed. 525, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1904). Secretary of War, to order re-
moval of obstructing bridges, Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 51 L.Ed. 523,
27 Sup. Ct. 367 (907). Secretary of Agriculture, to prescribe regulations (violations of which
to be criminal offenses) for use of national forests, United States v. Grimaund, 220 U.S. 5o6,
55 L.Ed. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. 48o (1911). Interstate Commerce Commission, to specify accounting
methods required to be followed by carriers, I.C.C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194,
56 L.Ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. 436 (1912). President, to change tariff rates, J. W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 72 L.Ed. 624,48 Sup. Ct. 348 (1928). There are other cases.
See comment, 31 M:ch. L. Rev. 786 (i933).
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legislation an essential part of the machinery of government. 86 As Elihu
Root has said, "the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative
power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight."' 7
Doubtless a Congressional enactment empowering the President to pro-
mulgate what laws he pleased upon any subject would be held invalid by
the judges. Somewhere short of such a statute the judges will draw the
line. The recovery legislation does leave to the President and the other
delegates wider discretion than did any of the statutes upheld in the past.
Whether, notwithstanding the exigency which led to their passage, they
will be held to go too far, will depend upon the judges's statesmanship,
not upon the document, existing doctrines, or past decisions.
Trm RECOvERY LEGISLATION AND THE INVASION EY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF FIELDS RESERVED TO TE STATES
The federal government possesses only those powers delegated to it by
the Constitution. An Act of Congress, or subordinate legislation or official
action thereunder, will be held invalid unless it can be referred to powers
conferred on Congress by the document. But by interpretation and con-
struction of the document, the Supreme Court has discovered many
powers not evident to one reading it. As the United States has become
economically and socially more and more a single unit, the federal govern-
ment has gradually extended its control and the Court has felt able to
justify practically all of these extensions.
I
Most of the statutes which comprise the recovery legislation are clearly
within powers of Congress long recognized by the Court. To the currency
and fiscal powers, held to result from the power to coin money, from the
taxing power and from other powers, can be referred all of the legislation
and official action relating to currency and inflation, the invalidation of
the gold clauses, the regulation of banks and of dealings in foreign ex-
change, the calling in of gold. For most of this regulation, the commerce
clause is also a possible peg. To a spending power expressly or impliedly
conferred by the clause granting Congress the power to tax, can be referred
the Farm Credit Act, the Home Owners' Loan Act, the Public Works Act,
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, the Civilian Conservation Corps Act,
the Emergency Relief Act, the National Employment Service Act. The
contention once made that the federal spending power may be exerted
86 See, reviewing several recent studies, Carr, Delegated Legislation in England as Seen from
Abroad, 16 journal Comparative Legislation and International Law 96 (1934).
87 Addresses on Citizenship and Government (ig96). Quoted by Frankfurter and Davison,
Cases on Administrative Law (1932), x5.
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only in fields directly related to other powers possessed by the federal gov-
ernment has long been abandoned;58 moreover, since these statutes au-
thorize the expenditure of funds raised by general taxation only, no one
will have sufficient interest to attack them.89 To the commerce clause can
be referred the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act; to that clause
and to the power over the mails can be referred the Securities Act.
II
The National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment
Act (with the possible exception of the processing tax levied under the
authority of the latter) are, I believe, referable only to the commerce
clause.90 Applications of the subordinate legislation promulgated under
these statutes may be attacked as federal interference in fields reserved
by the Constitution to state control, but the statutory provisions author-
izing the codes and licenses are not themselves subject to such attack.
The N.I.R.A. provides that violation of a code shall be a criminal offense
only if it occurs "in any transaction in or affecting interstate commerce."
The A.A.A. authorizes licenses (imposing as conditions provisions compa-
rable to those in the N.I.R.A. codes) for the handling of agricultural prod-
ucts "in the current of interstate or foreign commerce" only. Congress has
expressed its intention that codes and licenses shall have the widest ap-
plication it has power to give them. If a code or license cannot constitu-
tionally be applied to a particular transaction, the statutes do not author-
ize its application thereto. Codes and licenses have been applied and are
now being applied to transactions formerly controlled by state law. Are
these applications violative of the Constitution and therefore of the
statutes?
The document, doctrine, and past decisions leave it uncertain to what
transactions the power of Congress extends. The document makes no
attempt to define what activities are interstate (or foreign) commerce
activities. Doctrine and past decisions make it clear that transportation
of persons, things, or ideas across state lines falls within but does not
exhaust the category. What other activities fall within it is far from clear.
Moreover, doctrine makes it dertain that Congress may regulate, under
the commerce clause, some activities which do not themselves constitute
interstate commerce, because of the effect those activities have upon
81 Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548 (X923).
89 See supra notes 68 and 69.
90 There is, of course, no clause conferring upon Congress power to legislate to promote the
general welfare. Congress may levy taxes and spend the funds thus raised to promote the gen-
eral welfare. Article I, Section 8, Clause i. See Corwin, supra note 88. The preamble, which
states that the general welfare is one of the objects to promote which the Constitution was
established, is not a grant of power. See infra, 696.
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interstate commerce activities; but doctrine does not make clear what
non-interstate commerce activities Congress may thus regulate nor what
effect they must have upon interstate commerce activities to render Con-
gressional regulation of them permissible.
Decisions either upholding or invalidating state regulation of a par-
ticular activity are sometimes thought to indicate the field of Congres-
sional competence under the commerce clause. But since Congress may
sometimes regulate intrastate commerce activities, it is clear that they
do not. Moreover decisions upholding or denying state competence as
to a particular activity do not necessarily indicate even whether that
activity is interstate or intrastate commerce. Interstate activities are
affected by intrastate activities and by regulations of the latter; the con-
verse is also true. Doctrine asserts that state statutes are invalid if they
"unduly" burden, obstruct, or interfere with interstate commerce activi-
ties. A state statute may be held invalid either because the activity it
directly affects is interstate commerce (and its effect thereupon constitutes
an "undue" interference therewith) or because, although the activity is
intrastate commerce, this particular regulation of it indirectly affects and
unduly interferes with other, interstate commerce, activity. Similarly, a
state statute may be held valid either because the activity it directly
affects is intrastate commerce (and it involves no indirect "undue" inter-
ference with other, interstate commerce, activity) or because although the
activity is interstate commerce this particular regulation of it does not
constitute an "undue" interference therewith. Even when the Court has
placed a decision explicitly upon one rather than the other of these alter-
natives and definitely characterized a particular activity as interstate (or
as intrastate) commerce, it may later treat the case as resting upon the
other alternative.9'
Decisions that state statutes regulating particular activities do or do
not constitute "undue" interferences with interstate commerce are not,
therefore, relevant authority upon the question whether Congressional
power under the commerce clause extends to those activities. The valid-
ity of a Congressional statute founded on the commerce clause depends
upon whether the activities it regulates either constitute interstate com-
merce or so affect interstate commerce that the particular Congressional
regulations imposed are valid.92 The document does not furnish a test.
91 See, e.g., East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465, 471 ff., 75 L.Ed.
"171, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (193i), where Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252
U.S. 23, 64 L.Ed. 434, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1920) is thus treated.
92 The Court frequently upholds an application of a federal statute without deciding which
alternative basis of Congressional power is present. See, e.g., Local 167, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 396 (i934).
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The only relevant doctrines and decisions are those which relate specifi-
cally to the validity of Congressional statutes.
Doctrine permits Congress to regulate intrastate commerce activities
to the extent necessary to preserve, protect, and foster interstate com-
merce. Upon the basis of this doctrine, past decisions have permitted
further and further extensions of Congressional power.93 The concept of
a "stream of interstate commerce," including many intrastate commerce
activities, has been employed.94 It has been asserted that where intra-
state activities are so intermingled with interstate commerce activities
that the latter can be regulated effectively only if the former are subjected
to the same regulation, Congress may regulate both.95 It is probably true
that all intrastate activities have some remote effect upon interstate com-
merce and that conceivable Congressional legislation could so regulate
them as to foster interstate commerce. Somewhere short of that, the
Supreme Court will probably draw a line limiting Congressional power
under the commerce clause. Neither the document, existing doctrines,
or past decisions furnish any basis for prediction where that line will be
drawn. They do indicate that codes and licenses can be validly applied
far outside the field of interstate commerce itself. But whether, for ex-
ample, a minimum wage provision in an N.I.R.A. code can be validly ap-
plied to a Chicago barber shop depends wholly upon the judges' states-
manship.
III
The N.I.R.A., the A.A.A., and perhaps the Securities Act raise ques-
tions of another type. It is sometimes contended that these statutes, or
parts of them, though they constitute an exertion by Congress of powers
granted to it by the Constitution, were enacted for the purpose of achiev-
ing results in fields control over which is reserved by the Constitution to
the states and that they are therefore invalid. The Child Labor Cases 96
93 The Safety Appliance Act validly applies to intrastate trains on tracks over which inter-
state trains run. Southern Railway v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 56 L.Ed. 72, 32 Sup. Ct. 2
(191x). Intrastate rates may be ordered raised if so low that interstate commerce is burdened
or discriminated against. Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B.& Q. Ry., 257 U.S. 563, 66 L.Ed.
371, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922). Cf. such an application of the Sherman Act (26 Stat. 209, 189o) as
that in Swift & Co. v. United States, x96 U.S. 375, 49 L.Ed. 518, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (i9o5) with
that held invalid in The Sugar Trust Case, 156 U.S. i, 39 L.Ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1895).
94 See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 66 L.Ed. 735, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922). See
Ribble, The "Current of Commerce," i8 Minn. L. Rev. 296, 32 ff. (1934).
95 See, e.g., United States v. New York Central Railroad Co., 272 U.S. 457, 464, 71 L.Ed.
350, 47 Sup. Ct. 130 (X926).
96 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 62 L.Ed. 1101, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (i918); Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 2o, 66 L.Ed. 817, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1922).
See also, Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 L.Ed. 822, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1922) invalidating
regulation under the taxing power of sales of grain for future delivery. Similar regulation, under
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are cited in support of these contentions. The first case, decided in 1918,
invalidated a Congressional prohibition of the shipment in interstate com-
merce of the products of child labor. The second, in 1922, invalidated a
Congressional tax upon mines and factories in which child labor was em-
ployed. Both statutes were regarded by a majority of the Court as un-
constitutional invasions by Congress of powers reserved to the states by
the Tenth Amendment. It is now urged that the exclusion of oil produced
in violation of the N.I.R.A. Code from interstate commerce, the exclu-
sion of prospectuses forbidden by the Securities Act from interstate com-
merce and from the mails, and the levying of the processing tax under the
A.A.A. are unconstitutional for the same reason.
There are two alternatives open to the court. The first derives from the
fact that the written Constitution's grant of authority to Congress is
phrased in terms of powers, not fields of control. The preamble states that
the promotion of the general welfare is one of the objects to secure which
the Constitution was ordained. It is possible for the Court to take the
position that Congress is authorized to exert any power delegated to it for
the purpose .of promoting the general welfare in any field. The second
alternative derives from the Tenth Amendment, which provides that
powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states.
The Court has held that certain of the powers of Congress are exclusive,
that the states may not regulate matters falling within the scope of these
exclusive powers. It is possible for the Court to take the position that
similarly certain of the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amend-
ment are exclusive, that Congress may not exert its powers so as to regu-
late (or at least not for the purpose of regulating) matters falling within
these exclusive state powers.
Until the Child Labor Cases were decided, doctrine and decisions indi-
cated that the Court had taken the first of these alternative positions.97
These earlier decisions were not overruled, nor were they satisfactorily
the commerce clause, was later upheld. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. i, 67 L.Ed. 839,
43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923).
97 As to the taxing power, see McCray v. United States, i95 U.S. 27, 49 L.Ed. 78, 24 Sup.
Ct. 769 (i904), upholding prohibitory tax on yellow oleomargarine, and United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 63 L.Ed. 493, 39 Sup. Ct. 214 (i99), upholding tax intended to elimi-
nate the general sale of narcotic drugs.
As to power under the commerce clause, see The Lottery Case, i88 U.S. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492,
23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903), upholding the barring of lottery tickets from interstate commerce;
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 55 L.Ed. 364, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 (191r) upholding
the barring of impure foods and drugs; and other cases discussed in Corwin, Congress's Power
to Prohibit Commerce, i8 Corn. L. Quar. 477 (i933).
See, in general, Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution, i N. Car. L. Rev. 61
(1922).
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distinguished, in the Child Labor Cases. Doctrine is now confused. 98 It
is probable, though not certain, that the Court will eventually draw a
line somewhere, preserving for the states exclusive control of some mat-
ters. But with the document silent, with doctrine confused and past
decisions contradictory, where that line will be drawn depends wholly
upon where the judges believe it should be drawn.
CONCLUSION
There is a written Constitution in France. The French judges do not
claim power to treat as invalid statutes they think inconsistent with it.
But it does not follow that French legislators do not feel restrained, be-
cause of the existence of the written Constitution, from enacting laws
forbidden by it.
In Australia there is also a written Constitution. The judges there do
treat as invalid statutes they think inconsistent with its provisions. Doc-
trines construing and interpreting those provisions do derive in part from
the statesmanship of the judges. But the Australian judges do not claim
power to pronounce doctrines of constitutional law which derive not at
all from their written Constitution.
This power to invalidate statutes upon the basis of wholly extra-
documental constitutional law was not exercised by the Supreme Court
of the United States during the first century of its existence. During most
of our history, the Court confined itself to functions similar to those
exercised by the Australian courts-the American constitutional system
then resembled closely the Australian. Between such systems and our
present system, there is a gap as large as that which separates such sys-
tems from the French system.
The r6le of the judges under our present system-with the due process
clauses held to authorize them to treat as invalid all statutes they deem
to be unwise or unjust-renders relatively insignificant the r6le of the
written Constitution. It is possible that a majority of the nine justices of
the Supreme Court may vote against the constitutionality of minor parts
of the recovery program. If they do, it will not be because of the words
of the document, or because of doctrine or past decisions. It will be be-
cause they believe those parts of the recovery program to be so unwise
that they think the Court should invalidate them.99
98 See articles by Powell and Corwin supra note 97.
99 The considerations upon which depends the wisdom of the recovery legislation's expan-
sion of federal authority, its delegations of legislative power, and its extensions of govern-
mental regulation-the non-documentary, non-doctrinal, non-decisional considerations upon
which, therefore, the judges should base their decisions as to its constitutionality-are
admirably stated and developed by John Dickinson in his paper, Political Aspects of the
New Deal, 28 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 197 (I934).
